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JUDGEMENT, OPINION & JUDGEMENTALISM
As with the much vexed subject of Risk and Probability, the next biggest confusion for social care workers is the nature of judgement and its role in social care work. I never cease being amazed and despairing of people working in social care and related fields who tell me that they "don't make judgements". Oh yeah? Well, I think you have got the wrong end of the stick! Yes, I get pretty angry about it. Why? Because judgement is the bedrock of all that happens in social care and related fields like psychology and psychiatry and so to deny that it happens (and has to happen) is to deny the very existence of the issues which bring a service user into contact with services. Ultimately, it is a denial of the service user's experience. Some people can't even accept that their personal values drive their social care judgements. It is almost as if such people think that so-called objective criteria like checklists of signs and symptoms fall out of the ceiling (appear as if from the vacuum) and are not derived from collections of individual observations suitably reinterpreted into collectivised societal judgements on what is acceptable and what is not relative to a preferred set of norms (can't get more judgemental than that!). Presumably, it is the very thought that judgement seem too close to the concept of "values" that is too much for such people. How can our values influence work in social care? Ok then. Let's start with basics: Values. Types of Values:
Note that even at the basic level of personal and private values there is something akin to what we call "judgement" lurking in the background. If I like Pepsi-Cola I may not be conscious of making a judgement about it but it is implicit in the phrase that I have done so. But maybe this is going too far. Very young children show liking for things and to say that they have made a "judgement" is really pushing the meaning of the word. Young children also show preferences for things as in liking Coca-Cola above Pepsi-Cola. Is this judgement? No, maybe not. But why? Let's put off answering that for a moment to look more at values. Firstly, the "private" / "public" distinction. If I tell you I like Pepsi my "value" that I place on Pepsi is now public. You know about it. I might tell the world about it as here on this website. Many of my values are private. I tell no one. Others are almost private insofar as knowledge is restricted to very close friends and relatives. Why is this important? It is important because people often believe things (for their own reasons connected with their own private values) which may be contrary to what their peer group believes and values or, even more significantly, to what their professional grouping publically avows. If this is so, then we can almost guarantee some measure of cognitive dissonance if such a person were placed in the situation of having to act in a way contrary to his / her own personal values. This may well result in errors of judgement. Placing a value on something and having a value are two different things but which are intimately connected. Value is a kind of "weighting" we put on something. We might do this because it is nice to drink or eat, because it gives us comfort, because it espouses some idea that is important to us. Public values are shared values in both senses that others know about them and may or may not also agree with them. If several of us get together because we all agree that we share a value then that original value becomes a group value. If a sufficient number of people "sign up" to it then it may become a societal value. Some sets of group / societal values are codified into sets of ethical rules or moral codes. When this happens another special set of "values" are brought to bear which are expressed through what are called "deontic operators". These are the terms by which values are translated into action. In a real sense, they are terms which specify instruction in how the ethical rules or morals work in the everyday world. For example: Thou shall not kill: gives a precise instruction that an act is forever proscribed. Thou should honour thy neighbour: gives an instruction which tells you how to act but allows you some choice. The terminology of deontic operations uses certain terms of modal logic: Must, Will, Should, May, Might, Ought, Shall and so on. At the highest level, group-agreed (in a democracy) ethical or moral codes are elevated to the status of Law. At this stage we now enter and flirt with the realm of politics. And at this level, deontics become the mechanism by which the law is enforced. If I disobey the law which says that I must not kill a person, then a set of additional codes (law) says that I must be (notice the strength of the deontic operator) arrested and subjected to punishment. The responsible people (Police and Courts) would themselves (must be) be subjected to sanction if they did not carry out the law and apprehend me, try me and punish me for the crime. Within social care we have two sets of values which are of prime importance. The first and most supreme is the Law. Indeed, there are many sets of law which are of fundamental importance to social workers in the UK. The three most important sets of legislation are:
In addition, social care workers are bound by the General Social Care Council (GSCC) Codes of Practice . Failure to live up to the Practice Codes could result in disciplinary action being taken against the alleged offender by the GSCC. You may find this further discussion on Value Theory useful. Back to Judgement We have seen "judgement" lurking in the background in our discussion on values. However, we balked at calling the "valuations" of young children "judgements." Let's look a little deeper into this. A young child will certainly express preferences. Even very young children do this. In behavioural terms we can say that they like to see things swinging about them above their beds (mobiles); that they like their food mashed up; that they like sweets and so on. When children become verbal, they very soon learn to express their preferences in words. So it would seem reasonable to say that even very young children seem to be able to express (even if just behaviourally) that they value X above Y, or that they just like (value) X. Words give power - the power of reasoning. I can tell you that I prefer Coke to Pepsi because I like Coke more than I like Pepsi. I am conscious that I put more "weight" (value) on Coke than I do Pepsi. Someone may say of me: His opinion is that Coke is better than Pepsi. "Opinion"? How did that word get in there? Opinions and Judgements When is something "just opinion" and when is it "judgement"? This is a difficult one! I claim that there isn't any clear difference at all. Often it depends on who is talking and their own sense of self-importance. Mr Jack Straw is currently Justice Minister in the British Government. If you ever listen to Mr Straw speaking you will find that he doesn't have opinions as such. Rather he makes "judgements" on matters of issue. Some people who listen to Mr Straw believe that his words seem more often opinions rather than judgements. It all depends on whether you like what he says really. But there is a difference nevertheless and it is connected with what we call "Judgementalism" rather than simply "Judgement". But I must warn that none of these terms are absolutely clear cut as to their referents. One person's opinion is another's judgement and is yet another's expression of judgementalism. For example:
Are the above 1) to 3) opinions, judgements or expressions of judgementalism? What would make for difference? All three are expressive of some valuation having taken place. In 1) the valuation appears to be
negative. There is something about red hair which is intensely disliked. So we have negative (value) "weight" applied in all three but 3) also implies comparison of "worst than". It is when we examine the nature and processes which go on behind the "weighting" that differences begin to emerge. When we find ourselves or others valuing something it is natural to ask the question why. This leads us to evidencing our valuation. What sort of evidence could a person adduce for saying 1) above? Maybe the person becomes violently sick every time he sees someone with red hair. If so, we might understand his wish that such people should be locked up out of his sight. But this sentiment would seem to most of us entirely and selfishly personal. Most of us do not experience the same reaction. Therefore, we do not apply the same valuation. Most people would say that the view expressed in 1) is not just simply opinion but that it is the worst kind of judgementalism. And by this epithet we mean that the opinion of 1) is unjustified because it is selfish and nasty. What about 2)? Viewers of this site from overseas might not be aware of the intense controversial feelings that 2) generates in the UK. Hunting foxes with hounds in the countryside is a tradition that has (until a recent Government ban) carried on for hundreds of years. Many people who live in the countryside, and not least farmers who care for livestock, get very het up about the damage that foxes can do. Whilst other people, both countryside residents and town dwellers, detest the very idea of people dressing up and gathering together as if for some sort of party and riding to hounds which, if they catch a fox, will rip it to shreds in moments. There are arguments on both sides. Both sides claim to be able to evidence their opinions. Suppose you know nothing whatever about this debate. This is quite possible if you are an overseas visitor to this site. On what side would you fall down? And how would you make the judgement as to which side to support? I don't know the answer to my question but did you notice the trick I just pulled? One moment I was describing each side's evidence as opinion and the next moment I invited you to read up on the evidence of both sides and then make a judgement. When does opinion = judgement? And lastly, what about 3)? This time I'll nail my colours to this mast. I believe in 3). Why? I'll do no more than refer you to our background information on Attachment Theory on this site. You can make your own judgement! So what is the difference between Opinion, Judgement and Judgementalism? Opinion = may or may not be justified. Enormous range between off the cuff selfish remarks and well thought out and evidenced views. Judgement = implies a carefully considered opinion deriving from the consideration (which will likely entail detailed analysis and assessment) of various and opposing or contrary sets of evidence and opinions on a subject. Judgementalism = glorified opinion which tends to be of the off the cuff sort and is non-justified or justifiable. But this ain't necessarily so! Have a look at the top of this page and the second paragraph and note the judgemental concept of "preferred set of norms" and now read on! How does all this connect with social work? This is where the situation does become difficult. All assessment in social care is based on the concept of the "normative". Yes, it is true that "norms" often differ from culture to culture. This makes it an even more difficult task. But difficult though it is, if you are employed in social care, it is something you are expected to do. And this is where I get very angry when I hear people in social care claim that they don't make judgements. Either they are in fantasy land or sit around all day doing nothing. Perhaps both. What follows is a (slightly revised) fragment from my published essay on Risk and the Framework for Assessment printed as Chapter 6 in Martin Calder and Simon Hackett (2003) Assessment in Childcare (Russell House). See recommendations in Bibliography Fragment from "Risk and the Framework for Assessment" (2003) The application of professional judgement to determine need and do something about it requires that all practitioners develop extensive knowledge and skills in: v Applying theory and knowledge to determine levels of harm relative to norms of behaviour, intentionality and circumstance and in reference to possible negative impacts on child development. v Assessment of need should take place within a culturally and socially sensitive framework of anti-oppressive and anti-discriminatory practice. v Framing estimates of the future probability of harm in terms of future outcomes where: (a) (hypothesis) no intervention occurs. (b) (hypothesis) intervention is considered. There might be several possible hypothesized interventions. (c) levels of cooperation and motivation to change are determined. (d) intervention is ongoing and evaluated against clearly specified outcomes. v Applying methods of intervention to effect change and having the ability and flexibility to evaluate and change the method or manner of intervention when needed. This means that a thorough knowledge of child development is essential, as is knowledge of social work related theory (e.g. Attachment Theory) and of anti-oppressive and anti-discriminatory practice that inform us of normal and abnormal development within the contexts of culture and disability. Deficits in child development, parenting capacity and family and environmental factors, as well as strengths, are all identified in terms of “standards” that are rarely, if ever, fully articulated[1] – they are the “norms” we use (usually unconsciously) to apply value judgements as to whether a behaviour, an intention, a facility (e.g. why a guard for a fire?) is present or not, or in “excess,” or is “deficient.”[2] This is an exercise in pure normative based (value) judgement, whether the judge is a member of the public, a social worker, a health visitor using median based centile charts, or the foremost paediatrician in the country. This is why cultural knowledge and sensitivity is so vitally important, as well as knowledge of relative frequency based “normative” checklists across the range of human development, behaviour, social circumstances and cultures. Furthermore, we should be guided in our normative-based “valuations” by a sound understanding of and genuine commitment to social work ethics. The Value (Need) Component of “Risk” Where there is “need” there exists risk. “Risk” is a concept which is totally incoherent unless it is understood in terms of being composed of judgements concerning a possible outcome having both value and probability (See Fig 2).[3] Fig
2.
The “value” component can be positive + or negative -. Also, see our Probability and Risk Dimensions page. The identification of any human need is intrinsically a normative based value judgement.[4] Since we are talking about need, the value is negative. The concept of need implies a possible “harm” or “impairment” which we can associate with a possibility of future occurrence within a definite timescale (of concern to us) and which might further result in an avoidable heightening of the need if there is a failure to meet the need. In social work, we are sanctioned by legislation to make judgements on whether something is harmful or constitutes impairment. Whenever we do this, we make a value judgment relative to the “norms” for this culture in terms of its legally preferred normative standards. We are enjoined to take fully into account the norms of other cultures but, at the end of the day, we must judge relative to the preferred set of norms, e.g. the law and its precedents and the bodies of knowledge (theory and research) that are accessed to guide the evolution of legal and professional standards. The set of norms that frame our attitudes and responses is forever changing – although the abuse of children has always been with us (Corby, 1993). The
Assessment of Need and Value Judgements A useful way of assisting the judgement of need is the application of the scaling methodology successfully used in Brief Therapy interventions.[5] All value judgements can be referenced to scales, which at one end encompass the normal and at the other the seriously abnormal. Such “scales” are entirely subjective aids to assessment. However, the point of using them is that they can demonstrably show others the subjective “value” placed on this or that item and allow you to say why (evidence). Another way of doing this is to use part of the conceptual apparatus of Axiological Value Theory (Fig 3) to illustrate areas of normal “acceptability” which is equated with “good enough parenting.” Behaviour, intentionality[6] or circumstance[7] and which are abnormally in “excess” (too much of it) or “deficient” (not enough of it) are equated with “unacceptable” parenting. The behaviour, intentionality or circumstance (these are things that exist) is judged relative to a dimension known as the “ontological dimension.” This dimension is scaled on a continuum having at opposite ends areas of “excess” and areas of “deficiency.” Fig 2a
EXCESS DEFICIENCY The light area in the middle of the arrow is the “normal range” of behaviour, intentionality and circumstance that is defined by our experience, theory, knowledge and culture. Any “item” of behaviour, intentionality and circumstance is amenable to a judgement of normality or harm (excess or deficiency) in relation to a “value dimension” overlaid on to the ontological dimension. This value dimension is simply a scale of “goodness” or “badness,” or for our purposes “acceptability” or “unacceptability,” with respect to how the need or harm is perceived. (Fig 3). The whole point about the use of knowledge, research and theory is to enable the evidencing of judgements. Without this, the judgement is arbitrary (judgementalism) and likely to be grossly unfair. When assessing a service user, you have to show how, say, behaviour X is “deficient” at the point where you place it. Indeed, without using knowledge and theory, it is possible that you would not be able to make a reasoned judgement at all. “Facts” tend to be meaningless unless “interpreted” through some relevant system of understanding. Furthermore, your scaling can then be readily disputed by parents or constructively used as a means of securing agreement and evaluating progress via intervention. The technical apparatus of Axiological Value Theory (Fig 3) underlies the graphical representation of Fig 7 “The Sphere of Normative Acceptability.” (Fig 7 appears in the book Chapter referred to above). It must be emphasised that the pictorial representation of the “fuzzy” area (the “fuzzy mist” of acceptability, as we might call it) of normative acceptability is a modelling device for illustrative purposes only. Fig 3.
I would invite all those people who like to pretend to themselves that "value judgements" don't come into assessment practice to take a good, long hard look at the above diagram. Yes, I know it is but a model! But nevertheless, notice that the ends of the axes of the value dimension are labelled "acceptable" (inside the fuzzy mist of the norm) and "unacceptable" (outside the fuzzy mist) and the ends of the behaviour dimension (outside the fuzzy mist) are labelled "deficient" or in "excess." What does this mean? Don't think too hard because I'll tell you exactly what it means - it means GOOD and BAD. And it is as simple as that. No matter how you might twist and turn and have sleepless nights of how horrible and politically incorrect and insensitive all this is, you will never escape it - not even in your wildest solipsistic dreams will you wriggle free. And no, I'm not advocating that we say to people that they are "bad" (see note 2 below) because they are not. This is not what I'm getting at. What I am saying is that the dichotomy of good and bad is underlying all your judgements in social care whether you like to acknowledge that or not.
References: The above fragment is taken from: Risk and the Framework for Assessment printed as Chapter 6 in Martin Calder and Simon Hackett (2003) Assessment in Childcare (Russell House). See recommendations in Bibliography [1]
An example of written normative standards is scholastic tests such as the
Department of Children, Schools & Families e.g. Standard Assessment Tests. Another
example of normative checklists for abnormal behaviour would be the
checklists of DSM IV: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders:
American Psychiatric Association. 2 The DoH seems not to
like the term “deficient,” but “abnormal” or “bad” are much
worse. Nevertheless, the word “deficient” is not, as the DoH says,
particularly empowering. More suitable language would need to be used when
working with service users. [3] See Nicholas Rescher (1983) Risk: a Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management ( Washington, UPA) [4] Interestingly, this flies in the face of the simplistic (and dangerous) interpretation of the ethic of universal “non-judgementalism” in social work. Indeed, I advocate here that the concept is incoherent unless it is understood as a necessary ethical intentional stance toward the client. The concept is usually understood (but unfortunately not always) in this way. [5] For example, Insoo Kim Berg (1988); Dave Hawkes et al (1998) [6] “Intentionality” is used in this paper as in philosophical psychology, to denote “object of mind.” A discussion on this is to be found in Rescher (1969). See also John Searle (1992) Chapter 8 of The Rediscovery of the Mind (London, MIT Press). [7] “Circumstance” is here used as a shorthand for “Family and Environmental Factors” in the Framework for Assessment
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